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JAPAN AND THE MULTIPLICITY 
OF CULTURAL PROGRAMMES OF MODERNITY 
 
S.N. Eisenstadt 
Professor Emeritus, Hebrew University of Jerusalem 
 
 
I 
 
One of the central problems or foci of studies of modernization has been the extent of 
convergence of modern societies, and concomitantly, whether with the worldwide expansion 
of modernity there will develop only one modern civilization. 
 In the context of these problems, and in particular the latter, Japan constitutes perhaps 
the most important test-case - and paradox. One central paradox, of the many that Japan 
constitutes for the analysis of modernity, is that this has been the first and at least till recently 
the only fully successful non-Western modernization of a non-Axial civilization - a 
civilization which could not be seen, in Weber's term, as a Great Religion or World Religion. 
 Weber's analysis of the civilizational roots of capitalism was part of his comparative 
sociology of religion. This comparative analysis was based on the premise that in all the 
Great Religions which he studied there existed the structural and cultural potentialities for the 
development of capitalism - but that it was only in the West these potentialities bore fruit. In 
other Great Religions or Civilizations - in what later on would be called Axial civilizations - 
these potentialities were obviated by the specific hegemonic combination of structural and 
cultural components that developed within them - very central among them being the 
confrontations between orthodoxies and heterodoxies or sectarianism. 
 Truly enough Weber dealt only with the emergence of the original, first capitalism - 
not with its expansion, and yet even in this framework the paradox of Japan, a non-Axial 
civilization that has become the first fully modernized non-Western society, stands out. 
 The explanation of this fact has been very often related to some of the structural 
characteristics of Tokugawa society,1 which were in many ways very similar to those which 
industrialization in Europe was attributed to - the development of structural pluralism, of a 
multiplicity of centres, of economic power, the breakdown of narrow segregated ecological 
frameworks, the opening up of family structure, especially indeed in the rural sector, which 
generated many new resources, and more than incipient, very wide, cross-domain 
marketization. Of no small importance were also the high levels of literacy and urbanization, 
and extensive economic integration.2
                                                 
1. The Tokugawa period was 1600-1867; the Meiji period was 1868-1912. 
2. See for instance T. Smith, Native Sources of Japanese Industrialization, 1750-
1920, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1988; J. Baechler, 
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 Given this structural similarity in the 'causes' of modernization or industrialization 
between western Europe and Japan, the latter also presents another interesting comparative 
paradox which is of great importance from the point of view of our discussion, namely that 
the pattern of modernity - economic, political, or cultural - is markedly different from the 
original Western one. 
 It has long been recognized that Japanese modern society, polity and economy exhibit 
some very distinct characteristics, a distinct mode of structurations of modern institutions and 
organizations which are structured in ways radically different from those which have 
developed in other - especially Western - societies. Such differences are not just local 
variations. They pertain to the very basic ways in which the various modern institutional 
arenas are regulated, defined, and the broader social and cultural contexts in which they 
operate. 
 The common denominator of these characteristics is a very high level of structural 
differentiation, mobility, openness and dynamics grounded in conceptions of service to social 
contexts, ideally (as promulgated in the Meiji ideology) to the national community. Neither 
the emphasis on equality nor the strong emphasis on achievement were grounded in any 
conception of principled transcendentally oriented individuality or of transcendental 
legitimation of different functional (e.g., political or economic) activities. 
 
 
II 
 
These distinct characteristics of institutional formation that developed in Japan are closely 
related to the rather specific mode of definitions of the major arenas of social life that have 
been prevalent in Japan. The major characteristics of this have been the strong emphasis on 
contextual frameworks and the concomitant relative weakness of fully formalized, abstract 
rules demarcating clearly between the different arenas of action, and defining them in 
abstract formal terms as separate entities. Any institutional arena - political, economic, family 
and cultural creativity, or individual, group or organizations - has been defined in terms of its 
relation to the social nexus in which it was embedded. Such nexus was defined in some - 
continuously changing - combination of primordial, sacral, natural and ascriptive terms. The 
distinctive characteristic of these terms was that they were not defined in relation to some 
principles transcending them. 
 Thus, social actors, individuals or institutional arenas, have been defined in their 
relation to other such actors not as autonomous ontological entities, but in terms of their 
                                                                                                                                                        
The Origins of Capitalism, Oxford, Blackwell, 1975. See also Jean Baechler, 'The 
Origins of Modernity: Caste and Feudality (India, Europe and Japan),' in J. Baechler, 
J.A. Hall and M. Mann (eds.), Europe and the Rise of Capitalism, London, Basil 
Blackwell, 1988, pp. 39-66. 
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mutual interweaving in common frameworks or contexts. 
 Concomitantly, the major arenas of social action have not been regulated above all by 
distinct autonomous, legal, bureaucratic or 'voluntary' organizations or rules - even if such 
organizations have developed within them - but mostly through various less formal 
arrangements and networks which have in their turn usually been embedded in various 
ascriptively defined, and continuously redefined, social contexts. 
 Accordingly, no social, economic or political sectors could easily develop a 
principled autonomy, autonomous claims to access to the centre, and it was very difficult for 
autonomous public spaces to develop. In contrast to such potential autonomy, there 
developed a strong tendency to the conflation of different occupational or class sectors within 
the different social contexts - be they enterprises, neighbourhoods or such frameworks as 
various new religions - above all within the context of the overall national community. 
Within such contexts, and in conjunction with the far-reaching structural differentiation, 
mobility and openness, there developed a very intensive dynamic - the best known outcomes 
of which were the educational and economic miracles. But it was in many ways a regulated 
dynamics but regulated in a rather distinct way. 
 It is indeed the combination of such regulations with very high levels of dynamics 
that attests to what constitutes one of the major puzzles for Western scholars - namely that 
Japan is highly regulated and controlled and yet not a totalitarian and a continually dynamic 
and innovative society.3
 
 
III 
 
In order to understand the roots of the development of such distinct institutional formations 
in Japan, it might be worthwhile to have a look at the crucial event in the modernization of 
Japan - the Meiji Ishin, the so-called Meiji Restoration - and to compare it, as has been often 
done in the literature, with the Great Revolutions - the English Great Rebellion and Civil 
War, the American and French Revolutions and the subsequent Russian, and even Chinese, 
ones.4 The basic long-range processes and causes leading to the downfall of the Tokugawa 
                                                 
3. See for instance K. van Wolferen, The Enigma of Japanese Power, New York, 
Knopf, 1988, and its very extensive bibliography. 
4. For the most recent presentation of the process of the Restoration see M.B. Jansen 
(ed.), 'The Meiji Restoration,' in J.W. Hall et al. (eds.), The Cambridge History of 
Japan, Vol. 5, Cambridge, 1989, pp. 308-67; C. Totman et al., 'The Meiji Ishin: 
Product of Gradual Decay, Abrupt Crisis or Creative Will,' in H. Wray and H. Conroy 
(eds.), Japan Examined: Perspectives on Modern Japanese History, Honolulu, 
University of Hawaii Press, 1983, pp. 55-78; W.G. Beasley, The Meiji Restoration, 
Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1972; K. Timbergen, Revolutions from Above, 
New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers, 1978. 
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regime were very similar to those of the Great Revolutions, just as the processes and the 
causes of the rise of the Tokugawa regime were similar to those of the crystallization of the 
early modern European absolutist regimes. The most important among such causes were the 
disintegration of the old mould of political economy through the development of new 
economic forces,5 and the consequent undermining of the bases of control of the ruling 
groups; the spread of education; the growing marketization of large sectors of the economy - 
two processes which cut across the different domains; the deterioration of the economic 
situation of the lower samurai and of large sectors of the peasantry; and the improvement of 
the economic situation of the merchants and of some peasant groups. Last but not least were 
the internal struggles within the central elite - in various samurai groups in the bakufu and in 
the domains. In the last decades of the Tokugawa regimes - as in those of the Absolutist 
regimes in Europe - there also developed, as we have seen in the cultural scene, new modes 
of intellectual and ideological discourse which called into question many of the basic 
premises of the Tokugawa ideology. All these processes constituted a very important 
background to the movements which toppled the Tokugawa bakufu. 
 The late Tokugawa period - from the Tempo reforms of the beginning of the 19th 
century - abounded in peasant rebellions, in rural and urban movements of protest,6 and in 
continuous struggles in the central court of the Shogun in the bakufu - as well as in the 
relations between the bakufu and the great lords, the daimyo. Extensive struggles also 
developed with the growing dissatisfaction of many of the lower echelons of samurai within 
the domains of the daimyo. It was the cooperation between various groups of upper and 
lower samurai within several domains, especially Choshu and Satsuma, with some 
connivance from the Imperial Court, that toppled the Tokugawa regime.7
 Intellectual ferment also abounded. New forms of political ideological discourse were 
developing - greatly influenced, on the one hand, by neo-Confucian schools and education 
and on the other by the various movements of nativistic schools and movements. The great 
expansion of education and literacy, of Confucian schools and academies - an expansion 
which probably made late Tokugawa Japan the most literate pre-industrial society - provided 
a very important background to the development of new discourse. New groups, above all of 
unattached educated Samurai (shishi) - and to a smaller extent urban and peasant groups - 
organized themselves and travelled around the country, promulgating various would-be 
radical programmes. There developed also, in common with the situations preceding the 
                                                 
5. For an early analysis see: Zenichi Itani, 'The Economic Causes of the Meiji 
Restoration,' The Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, Second Series, Vol. 
XVII, 1938. 
6. See for instance H.P. Bix, Peasant Protest in Japan 1590-1884, New Haven, Yale 
University Press, 1986. 
7. A.M. Craig, Choshu in the Meiji Restoration, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard 
University Press, 1961; W.G. Beasley, 'Politics and the Samurai Class Structure in 
Satsuma, 1858-1868,' Modern Asian Studies I, 1, 1967, pp. 47-57. 
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Great Revolutions, a general consciousness of the disintegration of the centre. 
 All these developments created at the end of the Tokugawa regime a potentially 
revolutionary situation, not dissimilar to the situations which developed on the eve of the 
Great Revolutions. 
 
 
IV 
 
The Meiji Ishin also shared some very important characteristics with these revolutions in 
terms of its 'outcomes'. In common with them it deposed an existing 'traditional' ruler, in this 
case the Shogun, and changed the composition of the ruling class entirely. 
 The institutional effects of the Meiji Restoration in terms of structural change and 
modernization are also easily comparable to those of Western revolutions - and in Japan, 
unlike in the first European or American revolutions, these processes were outcomes of 
conscious policies. The tempo of urbanization, of expansion of education, of 
commercialization (the high level of which, especially from the end of the eighteenth 
century, contributed in no small degree to the erosion of the Tokugawa regime) and the 
relatively quick process of industrialization and of crystallization of a modern capitalist-
industrial system, was very intensive.8 In many ways it was much quicker and more intensive 
than parallel processes in many European countries, as was also the very strong international 
orientation - i.e., an orientation to attain an independent, possibly a major standing in the new 
international order dominated by Western European and American economic or political and 
colonial orientation. 
 Similarly the Meiji Ishin ushered in a new mode of legitimation of the political 
system, even if this new mode was ultimately presented as a restoration of an old, traditional 
one, and was legitimized in a combination of such restorative terms and new, above all 
pragmatic, knowledge. 
 Moreover, just as the Great Revolutions, the Meiji Ishin ushered in not only a new 
mode of legitimation, but a new - essentially modern - overall cultural programme which 
encompassed most arenas of life. It constituted indeed a total change of Japanese society.9 It 
was indeed a modern programme, even if in many crucial ways, it differed from the cultural 
programme of modernity in the West. 
 
                                                 
8. M.B. Jansen and G. Rozman (eds.), Japan in Transition: from Tokugawa to Meiji, 
Princeton University Press, 1986; Cambridge History of Japan, op. cit. 
9. See G.M. Wilson, Patriots and Redeemers in Japan - Motives in the Meiji 
Restoration, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1992, Chap. 2; Najita Tetsuo, 
'Conceptual Consciousness in the Meiji Ishin,' in N. Michio and M. Urrutia (eds.) 
Meiji Ishin: Restoration and Revolution. Tokyo, United Nations University Press, 
1985, pp. 83-8.  
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V 
 
And yet from the very beginning the Meiji Ishin differed in some very crucial aspects from 
the European, American (and later on the Russian and Chinese) revolutions. The first such 
difference is of course manifest in its very name - even if the term Ishin is possibly closer to 
Renovation, or being pulled in a new direction rather than simply Restoration as it has been 
called in Western literature. 
 The discourse that developed at the end of the Tokugawa period and during the Ishin 
and in the Meiji state contained several elements which can indeed be probably found in all 
programmes of modernity. Two - potentially contradictory - of these elements have been the 
more pragmatic of state formations and the more 'social' egalitarian communal themes, 
themes of social justice and participation. But the way in which these tensions worked out - 
ideologically and institutionally - differed greatly between the Meiji regime and the post-
revolutionary regimes in societies which developed out of Axial civilizations. 
 The crux of this difference was indeed, rooted in, or closely connected with, the Axial 
or non-Axial roots of, respectively, the Great Revolutions and the Meiji Ishin. Of special 
importance in this context was the nature of the utopian components or orientations, 
especially the relative predominance of universalistic, missionary, future-oriented 
orientations, which necessarily entailed a strong break with the past. 
 It is indeed here, in the cultural programme promulgated in the revolution and in the 
post-revolutionary regimes that some of the distinctive characteristics of the Meiji Ishin 
which distinguish it from the Great Revolution are to be found. This programme differed 
greatly from that of most of the Great Revolutions. It was in a way the reverse mirror image 
of those of the Great Revolutions - although in many ways it was no less radical. It was 
proclaimed as a renovation of an older archaic system which in fact never existed before, and 
not as a Revolution aiming to change the social and political order to totally reconstruct state 
and society alike, according to principles transcending that now in a new direction. 
 The new cultural programmes, the cosmology and ontology entailed in it were 
promulgated as the renovation of an older archaic system, which in fact never existed, not as 
a revolution aimed at changing the social and political order in an entirely new universalistic 
direction. Utopian, future-oriented orientations, rooted in a universalistic-transcendental 
vision, were, in contrast to the other Revolutions, very weak, almost nonexistent, although 
millenarian restorative themes were prominent in different sectors of the uprisings before and 
during the Restoration. 
 Concomitantly in the Meiji Ishin there did not develop, as was the case in the Great 
Revolutions in Europe, the U.S., Russia, and China, a universalistic, transcendental, 
missionary ideology, or any components of class ideology - two elements which were also 
very weak in the peasant rebellions and movements of protest of the Tokugawa period. Some 
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elements of a universal civilizing mission developed in late Meiji, in attitudes towards Korea 
and China, but these did not entail the conception of these societies constituting, together 
with the Japanese one, parts of a general universal civilization. The Meiji Ishin was inward-
oriented towards the Japanese people; it aimed at the revitalization of the Japanese nation, at 
making it capable of taking its place in the modern world, but it had no pretence to 'save' the 
entire world - mankind as a whole - in terms of a new universalistic, future-oriented utopian 
vision. Many of the leaders of groups which were active in the Restoration emphasized the 
importance of learning and of promulgating universal knowledge, but only very few of them 
translated it into principles of overall political action, of ways to reconstruct the Japanese 
polity and collectivity - and these leaders lost out very early in the game. Similarly, explicit 
social symbolism - especially class symbolism - was almost entirely absent and was certainly 
not incorporated into the major symbols of the new regime - not even in connection with the 
semi-utopian or rather 'inverted utopian' restorationist themes. 
 The cultural programme promulgated in the Meiji Ishin - and later on by the Meiji 
state - consisted of a mixture of pragmatic orientations to the question of how to adapt to the 
new international setting with strong Restorationist components or orientations. It constituted 
a combination of the restorationist nativistic vision with what may be called functional 
prerequisites of modern society, such as efficacy, achievement and equality. These later 
themes were indeed very strongly emphasized - but mainly in terms of their functional 
contribution to the organization of a modern society. 
 To follow Sonoda Hidehiro:10
 
The new principle of social equality of the four classes caused by the reorganization of the samurai class was 
embodied in tendencies commonly shared by the navy, army and university run by the central government. The 
character of social equality expressed in these tendencies was, of course, quite different from that of European 
egalitarianism. 'Equality' in this historical context meant that whoever had the ability of perform the samurai's 
specialized duty could have an 'equal' chance to do it. Conversely, all Japanese people should have 'equal' 
functions or duties to the state which have been exclusively occupied by the samurai estate. To realize the 
national policy of 'enrich the country and strengthen the military,' it was thought that 'equal' allocation of the 
samurai's specialized duty to the four classes was absolutely necessary. We would like to call this type of social 
equality 'functionalistic egalitarianism' because it was distinguished by the 'equal' requirement of all persons in 
their duties or functions to the state. 
 Functionalistic egalitarianism was not the recognition of 'equal' human rights as a political ideology 
which was of European origin and played a significant role in European history, but was the unintentional 
outcome of the samurai's thorough pursuit of practicality in service to the state. In giving explanations of the 
decline of the samurai class it is important to acknowledge that a distinct form of egalitarianism had already 
                                                 
10. H. Sonoda, 'The Decline of the Japanese Warrior Class, 1840-1880,' Japan 
Review, Vol. 1, 1990, pp. 73-112. 
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become established during the last days of the Tokugawa regime when Western political ideology, which had a 
strong influence on the equalization of highly stratified societies and on the decline of the aristocracy in Europe, 
began to be introduced into Japan... 
 
 It was only among small groups of intellectuals that there developed a tendency to 
ground these functional prerequisites in principled metaphysical or transcendental 
orientations, but they were not successful in changing the hegemonic orientations and 
premises. The message promulgated by the Meiji Restoration was oriented to the renovation 
of the Japanese nation - it had almost no universalistic or missionary dimensions. During the 
Ishin and especially after the Restoration numerous individual scholars engaged in the pursuit 
of knowledge from abroad and promulgated various, including strong universalistic, new 
ideas at home, but ultimately it was the so-called Meiji oligarchs, composed of the leaders of 
the different rebellious factions in the Restoration, that moulded the Meiji regime. 
 
 
VI 
 
It is the combination of these characteristics that makes the designation of 'revolutionary 
Restoration' or 'revolutionary Renovation' the most appropriate one to describe the Meiji 
Ishin. It was indeed - because it envisaged a new type of society, a new modern cultural 
programme - a revolutionary transformation, more than a 'simple' violent change of regimes, 
or more than 'just' a political event. It espoused a totally new vision of society. But the 
cultural programme which gradually crystallized in the Ishin, and above all in the Meiji State 
regime, distinguish it from the Great Revolutions and from the cultural programmes of 
modernity that were promulgated with them. 
 
 
VII 
 
These distinct characteristics of the Ishin ideology were closely related to some of the 
structural characteristics of the revolutionary process itself - which again distinguished it 
from that of the Great Revolutions. The most important of these characteristics were the 
relative weak connections between different rebellious groups, their relative segregation, the 
almost total absence of sacralization of violence, and of the construction of the centre in a 
liminal mode, which distinguish the revolutionary processes that toppled the Tokugawa 
bakufu from those of the Great Revolutions. 
 Of special importance in this context is the fact that close and continuous contacts did 
not develop between the major actors in the Restoration and religious or cultural sectarian 
groups or autonomous religious leaders. True enough, cultural developments were of very 
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great importance in the background of the Restoration. There was first of all the very wide 
spread of education,11 especially of Confucian education among the samurai groups, the 
merchants and even among some sectors of the peasants, making Japan probably the most 
literate pre-industrial country and contributing to a very high level of public consciousness. 
Second there were the many new religions,12 the 'religions of relief', which were so 
widespread in the last decades of the Tokugawa rule. 
 The numerous Confucian academies that sprung up since the eighteenth century 
greatly contributed to the development of such political consciousness and to the 
undermining of the legitimacy of the Tokugawa rule. Moreover, many of the themes of 
protest that developed, whether in the periphery or in the centre, were imbued with relatively 
recently constructed ideologies - whether Confucian or 'nativistic'. 
 But in all these developments there were but few independent Confucian scholars or 
Buddhist monks who played an autonomous role or attempted to construct the basic 
framework of the revolutionary discourse. 
 What is perhaps most distinctive about the Meiji Restoration as compared to the Great 
Revolutions was the almost total absence of autonomous, distinct religious or secular 
intellectual groups as active independent elements in the political process of the Restoration - 
and not as simply providing the background for the revolutionary process. This was indeed in 
marked contrast to the situation, for instance, with respect to the Puritans in the English 
Revolution and their descendants in the American one, the ideologues of the French 
Revolution, or the Russian Intelligentsia.13
 It was above all the samurai, some of them learned in Confucian lore, the shi-shi (who 
also included, as we have seen, some merchants, peasants and even women), who were most 
active in the Restoration - but on the whole they did not act as Confucian scholars bearing a 
distinctly Confucian vision, but rather as members of their respective social and political 
groups. Accordingly it was possibly the weakness, the near-absence of autonomous groups of 
ideologues, of intellectuals independent of other social sectors and cutting across them, that 
                                                 
11. I. Matsutaro, 'The Meiji Restoration and the Educational Reforms,' American 
Anthropologist 54, 1988, pp. 24-7; R. Rubinger, Private Academies of Tokugawa 
Japan, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1982; R.P. Dore, Education in 
Tokugawa Japan, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984.  
12. H.M. Harootunian, 'Religions of Relief,' in The Cambridge History of Japan, 
Vol. 5, op. cit. 
13. On the Puritans see: M. Walzer, The Revolution of the Saints, Cambridge Mass., 
Harvard University Press, 1966. On the Intellectuals in the French Revolution, see A. 
Cochin, La revolution et la libre pensee, Paris, Plon-Nourrit, 1924; idem, L'esprit du 
Jacobinisme, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1979; F. Furet, French 
Revolution, New York, Macmillan, 1970; Idem Interpreting the French Revolution, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981. On the Russian Intelligentsia, see: 
V.C. Nahirny, The Russian Intelligentsia: From Torment to Silence, New Jersey, 
Rutgers N.J., Transaction Publications, 1982.  
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explain the fact that in the Meiji Ishin there developed few new, relatively continuous 
political settings, frameworks bringing different social groups together and moulding them 
according to an overall political-social vision, and in which there developed common 
discourse and political activism.14
 Some additional aspects of the revolutionary process of the Meiji Ishin are interesting 
from a comparative point of view. Significantly, while violence did of course rage during the 
events leading to the Restoration and after it - it did not become sanctified to the extent that it 
did in the Great Revolutions. It was above all elite violence, especially on the part of 
Tokugawa loyalists, often manifest in rebellions such as that of Sakamoto Ryoma, who did 
engage in violence in order to 'restore' the shogun, very much in line with the more 
traditional type of violence, with the 'nobility of failure' that was sanctified at least among 
some of the elite groups.15 But unlike in the Great Revolutions, no such sanctification was 
accorded to popular violence, nor even to the violence that was employed by those samurai 
groups which toppled the bakufu regime. Such violence was not seen as the expression of the 
search for a new overall social order. 
 Similarly while liminal situations abounded, of course, among the different rebellious 
groups and movements of protest, yet the central political areas did not become, as in the 
revolutions, such a liminal area. 
 
 
VIII 
 
It was within the framework of these orientations that there developed the definition of 
modernity in Japan out of the parameters of the Meiji Ishin and the cultural programme of 
modernity that crystallized in the Meiji Ishin as keeping up with the times, as adapting to the 
times, to the mastery of Western technology and finding a proper place in the international 
arena. 'Keeping up with the times' was defined as the verdict of the movement of history, but 
such movement was not defined - as in the West, with its Christian roots, as well as to some 
extent in other civilizations in terms of historical progression as a historical process defined 
                                                 
14. T. Najita, 'Conceptual Consciousness in the Meiji Ishin,' op. cit.; H.D. 
Harootunian, 'Religions of Relief,' op. cit. For a comparative analysis see S.N. 
Eisenstadt, 'Frameworks of the Great Revolutions: Culture, Social Structure, History 
and Human Agency,' International Social Science Journal 44 (3), Aug. 1992, pp. 
385-401. 
15. M.B. Jansen, Sakamoto Ryoma and the Meiji Restoration, Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 1961; J. Morris, The Nobility of Failure: Tragic Heroes in the 
History of Japan, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1975; N.L. Waters, Japan's 
Local Pragmatist: The Transition from Bakumatsu Meiji in the Kawasaki Region, 
Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University.  
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or measured by some transcendental, universalistic criteria or values or vision16 - in terms 
which are perceived as being beyond existing mundane reality. Closely related was the quest 
for authenticity among wide sectors of Japanese society, for finding Japanese authenticity in 
the new intellectual sector. 
 This search for the authenticity of Japanese collectivity and the concomitant 
evaluation of modernity moved, as we have seen above, between several basic poles. One 
such major pole was the search to negate modernity - in such cases defined mostly as 
Western modernity - as undermining the true Japanese spirit or pristine nature; the other such 
pole was the appropriation of modernity by Japan and the concomitant attempts to identify 
the true Japanese as against other, Western modernity, sometimes even seeing this as a proof 
of technological success of the Japanese, of the superiority of Japanese spiritual sensibilities. 
One direction of the search for Japanese authenticity was the emphasis of the uniqueness of 
the spiritual essence of the Japanese peoplehood or collectivity. 
 However limited - as Befu and Manabe have shown the belief of wide sectors of 
Japanese society in many of the concrete tenets of Nihonjiron as objectively 'true' - the very 
wide spread of this literature and responsiveness to it does attest to the fact that it must have 
struck on some chords very close to the search for authenticity among large sectors of the 
Japanese population.17
 The other major direction of the search for identity, which could overlap with the 
former, but could also develop in a contrary direction, was that of search for authentic 
'natural' universal essence beyond the artificial contrivances of political, social, or even 
linguistic - a search which could be identified in such 'utopia' as those of Ando Shoeki.18 The 
emphasis on such universal essence was in principle universalistic - albeit couched in highly 
immanentist terms. 
 Despite strong differences between these orientations to modernity and to the 
                                                 
16. See for instance Kano Masanoa, 'The Changing Concept of Modernization', 
Japan Quarterly, Jan-Mar, 1976, Vol. XXIII, No. 1, pp. 28-36. See also G. 
McCormack and Y. Sugimoto (eds.), The Japanese Trajectory: Modernization and 
Beyond, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988; and T. Najita and H.D. 
Harootunian, 'Japanese Revolt Against the West: Political and Cultural Criticism in 
the Twentieth Century,' in the Cambridge History of Japan, Vol. 6, Cambridge Press, 
1988, pp. 711-60. See also, for a general discussion of the predicament of modernity 
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constitution of Japanese collective identity, the common core of this discourse was the strong 
immanentist orientations thereof and the concomitant bracketing out of universalistic values 
as rooted in transcendental visions or orientations which are perceived as being beyond 
existing mundane reality, beyond the 'times' - and as guiding them.19
 Closely related to this strong core of the Japanese discourse of modernity was the 
continual dissociation between 'Zweckrationalität' and 'Wertrationalität,' with a very strong 
tendency to extol instrumental and technological achievement in a technocratic mode - one of 
the more recent manifestations of which is the emphasis on information as the core of a new 
societal order, of non-confrontational society of which Japan is the precursor. There could 
also develop a total negation of such Zweckrationalität in the name of pristine Japanese or 
'natural' spirituality - with, however, but little discussion of the relation of such instrumental 
rationality with different Wertrationalität, or of the discourse of different 'Wertrationalitätan.' 
Concomitantly, there developed on the level of ideological discourse relatively little 
autonomous, critical evaluation by different groups of intellectuals, of the concrete 
developments of the modern society that developed in Japan, which could guide concrete 
political programmes. 
 
 
IX 
 
It was this cultural programme of modernity, rooted as it was in the non-Axial, immanentist 
ontologies that have been prevalent in Japan, that guided the crystallization of the Meiji state 
and later on the development of modern Japanese society, and to some extent at least the 
specific characteristics of the major institutional formations of modern Japan to which we 
have alluded at the beginning of this article. I will illustrate these characteristics in somewhat 
greater detail as they apply to the political arena. 
 The strong emphasis on the embeddedness of the major arenas of action in contexts 
defined in some combinations of natural, sacral or primordial terms can be identified first of 
all in the strong tendency to the conflation of the national community, of the state and of 
society - a tendency which has become especially prevalent in the modern and contemporary 
arenas. 
 Such conflation has had several repercussions on the structuring of the ground rules 
of the political arena. The most important of these repercussions have been the development, 
first of a weak concept of the state as distinct from the broader overall, in modern terms 
national community (national being defined in sacral, natural and primordial terms), and 
                                                 
19. Lawrence Olson, Ambivalent Moderns: Portraits of Japanese Cultural Identity, 
foreword by Ronald A. Morse. London: Rowman and Littlefield, 1992.  
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second of a societal state characterized20 by a strong tendency to emphasize guidance rather 
than direct regulation and permeation of the periphery by the centre. 
 The view of the Japanese state as a 'weak' one was proposed by D. Okimoto who has 
also proposed that power in Japan is not conceived as an independent entity to be applied to 
different arenas and life according to 'objective' criteria. Rather, it is embedded in a structure 
of interdependent relationships which operate on the basis of dispersed actions and 
coordination up and down vertical hierarchical networks, rather than on the basis of coercion 
from above. It is based on fine tuning, consensus building and continual adaptation. Hence 
government could be compared to an 'orchestra conductor',21 and there has developed a 
marked tendency - to use a term proposed by Victor Koschmann - to 'soft rule', the rule of a 
given authority, not grounded in some transcendental vision, and hence not confronting 
society in terms of such visions either. 
 Such conflation of the national community and of the state, and the concomitant 
weakness of distinct conceptions of the state and of civil society, had developed already in 
the Sengoku and Tokugawa periods, in the concept of Kokutai, and has developed in the 
modern and contemporary periods in the concept or slogan of 'united monarch and people' 
(kunmin dochii), and in the closely related distinction between Kokutai (national structure) 
and seitai (political structure) which makes the latter inferior to the former and embedded in 
it. 
 Closely related has been a very weak development of an autonomous civil society, 
although needless to say elements of the latter, especially the structural, organizational 
components thereof (such as different organizations) have not been missing. One of the most 
interesting corollaries of this embedding of the political arena and of civil society alike 
within the overall community has been, as we have seen, the absence in the historical 
('feudal') and early modern conceptions of autonomous legal rights and of representative 
institutions. In Japan, however, unlike in many absolutist, or totalitarian systems, the absence 
of such institutions was not connected with a strong symbolic distinction of the centre, of the 
state, or with strong efforts by the centre not only to control, but also to restructure and 
mobilize the periphery - according to a new vision destructive of the values hitherto prevalent 
in the periphery. 
 These characteristics of the political arena can be also identified in the political 
system which developed in Japan after the Second World War and which has recently been 
judged by a group of Japanese and Western scholars to be a clearly democratic system in 
which some of the major components of democracy - rule of law, freedom of assembly, of the 
press - have been continuously expanding. 
                                                 
20. For numerous illustrations of this mode of political activities, presumably rooted 
in the agrarian as against the equestrian society, see Shoichi Watanabe The Peasant 
Soul of Japan, foreword by Louis Allen. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989. 
21. D. Okimoto, Power in Japan, The Societal State, final draft, August 1989. 
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 Concurrently this system has continued to exhibit some very distinct characteristics. 
Closely connected to these characteristics of the major institutional arenas of modern Japan 
there has also developed a rather distinct pattern of political dynamics, especially of the 
impact of movements of protest on the centre. The most important characteristic of this 
impact was the relatively weak principled ideological confrontation with the centre - above 
all the lack of success of leaders of such confrontational movements to mobilize wide 
support; the concomitant quite far-ranging success in influencing, if often indirectly, the 
policies of the authorities and the creation of new autonomous but segregated social spaces in 
which activities promulgated by such movements could be implemented. 
 But it is not only that many of the components of a 'full' liberal democracy have been, 
as it were, underdeveloped, as manifest in the nature of the impact of movements of protest. 
What is especially important in the context of our discussion here are the reasons for such 
underdevelopment. 
 Such underdevelopment has been due not only to the presumed autocratic or 
repressive components of the regime. It is also - perhaps above all - rooted in some of the 
basic premises of the mode of legitimation of this system as it developed under the Meiji, 
above all in the very narrowness of the autonomous public space, or civil society, 
independent of the state organs and in the concomitant legitimation of the state in terms of its 
embeddedness in the national community. 
 The processes of democratization and of the continual diversification of sectors and 
elites that took place after the Second World War have expanded the access of broader 
sectors of society to the organs of government and imbued these organs with a greater respect 
for the legal specification of the rights of citizens and for legal procedure. It has not, 
however, greatly expanded the scope of an autonomous civil society which could promulgate 
its own criteria of legitimation and impose them on the state in the name of principles 
transcending the state and the national community alike. 
 The specific type of civil society that developed in Japan is perhaps best illustrated by 
the continual construction of new social spaces which provide semi-autonomous arenas in 
which new types of activities, consciousness and discourse develop, which however do not 
impinge directly on the centre. Those participating in them do not have autonomous access to 
the centre, and are certainly not able to challenge its premises. The relations between state 
and society are rather effected in the mode of patterned pluralism, of multiple dispersed 
social contracts. 
 But this weakness of civil society was not due to its suppression by a strong state, but 
rather to the continual conflation of state and civil society with the national community. 
While it is those close to the centre - oligarchies, bureaucracies, politicians and even heads of 
economic organizations - who have on the whole shaped the contours of this community, yet 
they have not done it in a continuous confrontational response to the demands of other 
sectors of civil society. The constitutional-democratic system that has developed in Japan has 
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not been grounded in the conceptions of principled, metaphysical individualism or in a 
principled confrontation between state and society as two distinct ontological entities. 
 Accordingly, changes in the types of political regimes, or in the relative strength of 
different groups, have not necessarily implied changes in principles of legitimation and in the 
basic premises and ground rules of the social and political order. 
 
 
X 
 
All these institutional characteristics of modern Japan are indeed closely related to the 
distinct cultural programme of modernity that developed there, with its strong non-Axial 
roots - as it crystallized in the Meiji Ishin and the Meiji state. 
 They attest to the possibility of the development of multiple programmes of 
modernity. They attest to the fact that the incorporation of different themes and institutional 
patterns of Western modern civilization in new Western European societies did not entail 
their simple acceptance in their original form. It rather entailed the continuous selection and 
reinterpretation of such themes and reconstruction of the institutional pattern. 
 Such cultural programmes that develop in these societies entailed different 
interpretations of the basic cultural programme of modernity; they entailed different 
emphases on different components of these programmes - such as man's active role in the 
universe; the relation between Wertrationalität and Zweckrationalität; the conceptions of 
cosmological time and its relation to historical time; the belief in progress; the relation of 
progress to history as the process through which the programme of progress occurs; the 
relation to the major utopian visions; and the relation between the individual and the 
collectivity, between reasons and emotions, and between the rational and the romantic and 
emotive, could be realized. 
 In many of these civilizations the basic meaning of 'modernity' - its cultural historical 
programme - was quite different from its original Western vision rooted in the ideas of 
Enlightenment, of progress, of the unfolding of the great historical vision of reason and self 
realization of individuals, of social and individual emancipation. 
 While modernity was, within many of the non-Western societies, conceived as 
growing participation both on the internal and international scene in terms derived from the 
ideas of equality and participation, the other dimensions - especially those of individual 
liberty, of social and individual emancipation and individual autonomy as closely related to 
the historical unfolding of reason, which were constitutive of the Western European 
discourse on modernity from the Enlightenment on - were not necessarily always accepted. 
 These different symbolic and institutional constellations have developed first of all 
with respect to the interpretation of the basic symbolic conceptions and premises of different 
modern civilizations; with respect to the ways in which these basic symbolical premises of 
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modernity are selected and reinterpreted according to the new 'modern' traditions; in their 
conception of themselves and of their past; and with respect to their new symbols and 
collective identity and their negative or positive attitudes to modernity in general and to the 
West in particular. 
 These processes of reinterpretation also apply to the basic concept of economic 
development. While the emphasis on economic and technological development has certainly 
become part of each modern or modernizing society or civilization, these still differ greatly 
with respect to the overall cultural and social premises. Above all, they vary with respect to 
the degree to which the emphasis on economic development is connected with an emphasis 
on the mastery of their respective environments as against an adaptation to it; to the relative 
importance of economic goals in the panorama of human goals; to conceptions of the social 
order to productive as against distributive economic orientations; with respect to the type of 
political regimes - whether authoritarian, pluralistic or totalitarian regime, with respect to the 
major modes of political protest and participation, to conceptions of authority, hierarchy, and 
equality. 
 These differences between the different programmes of modernity were not purely 
cultural or academic. They were closely related to some basic problems inherent in the 
political and institutional programmes of modernity. Thus, in the political realm, they were 
closely focused on the relations between the utopian and the civil components in the 
construction of modern politics; between 'revolutionary' and 'normal' politics, or between the 
general will and the will of all; between civil society and the state, between individual and 
collectivity. These different cultural programmes of modernity entailed also different 
conceptions of authority and of its accountability, different modes of protest and of political 
activity, and different modes of constitutional formations. 
 These considerations do not negate the obvious fact that in many central aspects of 
their institutional structure - be it in occupational and industrial structure, in the structure of 
education or of cities - very strong convergences have developed in different modern 
societies. These convergences were above all manifest in the development of common 
problems - but the modes of coping with these problems differed greatly between these 
civilizations. These differences are attributable to a great variety of reasons - such as, among 
others, the various historical convergences, the historical timing of the incorporation of 
different societies into the emerging international systems. But beyond all these reasons, even 
if in close relation to them, these differences were also closely related to the development of 
the new distinct cultural programmes of modernity which crystallized in these societies or 
civilizations. 
 These different cultural programmes of modernity were not shaped by what has been 
sometimes presented in some of the earlier studies of modernization as natural evolutionary 
potentialities of these societies; by the natural unfolding of their tradition, nor by their 
placement in the new international settings. Rather they were shaped by the continuous 
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interaction between the cultural premises of these different societies; their historical 
experience; and the mode of impingement of modernity on them and of their incorporation 
into the modern political economic, ideological world frameworks. 
 Such different cultural programmes of modernity crystallized through the process of a 
highly selective incorporation and transformation in these civilizations of the various 
premises of Western modernity. 
 From this point of view modernity development has to be viewed as a distinct type of 
civilization which has its own distinct expansive capacities. This approach is, of course, very 
close to the Weberian one, but in many ways goes beyond it, as well as beyond the initial 
studies of modernization of the fifties and sixties of this century. As against the assumptions 
of these latter studies it became clear that while indeed modernization and industrialization 
gave rise to many common problems and some common core institutional patterns, yet the 
patterns of institutional response to these problems vary greatly between different societies or 
civilizations. 
 Or, in more general words, it became clear that in their encounters with the impact of 
the political, economic, and ideological forces of modernization, different societies and 
civilizations develop different patterns of response, different dynamics, different patterns of 
modern civilization, and that these are to some degree at least related to the patterns of 
symbolic institutional dynamics that developed within them in previous 'historical' times. 
 Thus, while the spread of modernity has indeed taken place throughout most of the 
world, yet it did not give rise to just one civilization, one pattern of ideological and 
institutional response, but to at least several basic variants - and in order to understand these 
different patterns, it is necessary to take into account the pattern of historical development of 
these civilizations. 
 

